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Autism has traditionally been conceptualized and defined 
by core deficits in social interaction and communication 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Research has 
highlighted that autistic people1 perform more poorly than 
nonautistic people on many measures of social cognition, 
and these social-cognitive differences are believed to 
underlie real-world difficulties in interaction (Atherton, 
Lummis, Day, & Cross, 2019; Morrison et al., 2019).
However, research has also indicated that so-called 
autism-specific social difficulties could instead be bidi-
rectional in nature and that people of different neuro-
types may be mutually misunderstanding one another. 
An increasing number of studies provide converging 
evidence of nonautistic people misreading social situ-
ations with autistic people. For example, nonautistic 
people interpret facial emotions less accurately than do 
autistic individuals (Sheppard, Pillai, Wong, Ropar, & 
Mitchell, 2016), are less willing to interact with autistic 
people, overestimate how egocentric autistic people 
are (Heasman & Gillespie, 2017; Sasson et al., 2017), 
and overestimate how helpful they are to autistic peo-
ple (Heasman & Gillespie, 2019b). Nonautistic people 
are less accurate than autistic people at interpreting the 
mental states of autistic people (Edey et al., 2016), and 
finding autistic people difficult to read is related to their 
being perceived unfavorably by nonautistic people 
(Alkhaldi, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2019).
If differences in interaction styles are viewed as 
impairments for autistic people, we must also consider 
these differences with nonautistic people as examples 
of impairments that may exacerbate difficulties in social 
interactions for autistic people. Whereas the general 
theoretical narrative of the research literature has 
focused on autism-specific difficulties in social interac-
tion, two overlapping theoretical frameworks address 
the mismatch of interaction styles between nonautistic 
people and autistic people.
First, the double-empathy problem (DEP) proposed 
by Milton (2012) suggests that miscommunications 
between autistic people and nonautistic people result 
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Abstract
Deficit-based accounts of social and communication abilities continue to dominate autism research. However, emerging 
findings suggest that this view may be overly simplistic and discount the two-way nature of interaction. Here we discuss 
the reconceptualization of social cognition to consider such difficulties as examples of bidirectional, multifaceted 
misattunement between autistic and nonautistic individuals. Aligned with progressive theoretical frameworks, emerging 
empirical research indicates that mismatches in communication styles can contribute to autistic social difficulties and 
the important role that nonautistic difficulties play. We highlight two areas of future research with the aim of providing 
empirical support for the views that the autistic community has proposed over the past 2 decades. We discuss the 
impact of such a paradigm shift on a number of levels, including how bridging the gap between different interaction 
styles can reduce stigma and increase understanding. Adopting such a framework will provide radical opportunities 
for transformative societal changes and education around inclusion.
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primarily from a breakdown in reciprocity and mutual 
understanding rather than from autism-specific deficits 
in social communication. Difficulties in interactions 
occur because of different ways of experiencing the 
world and processing information (Milton, Heasman, & 
Sheppard, in press). For instance, autistic and nonau-
tistic people differ in how they process sensory infor-
mation (Marco, Hinkley, Hill, & Nagarajan, 2011), 
language (Brock, Norbury, Einav, & Nation, 2008), and 
social cues (Philip et al., 2010). Researchers of the DEP 
posit that social communication is not a singular dif-
ficulty embodied by a person with autism but a “double 
problem” experienced by both an autistic person and 
a nonautistic person within an interaction (Milton et al., 
in press).
Second, the dialectical misattunement hypothesis 
(DMH) posits that various psychiatric and developmen-
tal conditions are not a disordered function of indi-
vidual brains but a mismatch of interpersonal dynamics 
(Bolis, Balsters, Wenderoth, Becchio, & Schilbach, 2017). 
Drawing on implications from the Bayesian brain 
hypothesis (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & 
Burr, 2012) and predictive-coding and active-inference 
accounts (e.g., Mirza, Adams, Friston, & Parr, 2019), this 
framework suggests that autism should be considered 
a cumulative misattunement between people. Rather 
than viewing communicative difficulties in isolation, 
the DMH proposes that an accumulation of repeated 
reciprocal and dynamic misattunements over time will 
inevitably lead to increasing divergences in communica-
tion styles and interactions between nonautistic people 
and autistic people.
To test these hypotheses, researchers are exploring 
the mismatch of communication and interaction styles 
in a new way: by directly comparing how nonautistic 
people and autistic people interact with different neu-
rotypes (Crompton, Hallett, Ropar, Flynn, & Fletcher-
Watson, 2020; Crompton, Ropar, Evans-Williams, Flynn, 
& Fletcher-Watson, 2020). Empirical findings support 
the idea that autistic people interact more successfully 
and are more comfortable with other autistic people 
than with nonautistic people, indicating that there may 
be autism-specific social behaviors underlying more 
effective autism–autism interactions (Crompton, Hallett, 
et al., 2020; Crompton, Ropar, et al., 2020; Heasman & 
Gillespie, 2019a).
This groundbreaking area of research is beginning 
to provide empirical evidence to support the views that 
members of the autism community have advocated for 
many years. Autistic people often highlight feelings of 
comfort and relaxation, together with unique ways of 
engaging with each other, when exclusively in the com-
pany of other autistic people (Crompton, Hallett, et al., 
2020). Many autistic adults have spoken about the 
transformative impact of finding other autistic people 
to socialize with: “Being autistic in shared autistic space 
may be easier than being autistic in nonautistic space 
or in one’s own personal space” (Sinclair, 2010, para. 
30). Autistic adults have reported being better able to 
predict the behavior of other autistic people and having 
increased understanding with them (Milton, 2012). Peer 
support for autistic people and self-advocacy networks 
provide opportunities for autism-specific social interac-
tion and community building. This can create vital sup-
port and understanding for autistic people, who have 
spoken about the value of sharing experiences and 
knowledge and the comfort of meeting like-minded 
people (Crompton, Hallett, et al., 2020).
However, the mechanisms that underlie this ease in 
autism-specific interaction are not yet known. A key 
priority for researchers is to better understand these 
mechanisms and to examine how they may be different 
from the mechanisms that underlie successful nonau-
tistic interactions and autistic–nonautistic interactions. 
There are a number of reasons why this is important 
for research, practice, and the public understanding of 
autism. Adopting a framework that combines principles 
of neurodiversity and rigorous scientific methods is 
essential for reframing social cognition to include the 
strengths of autistic people and to create new defini-
tions for understanding autism-specific communication 
and interaction. This will allow us to begin moving 
beyond deficit-based theoretical accounts of autism that 
have historically dominated the field of research 
(Fletcher-Watson & Happé, 2019). Offering empirical 
support for the idea of difference, not deficit, will con-
tribute to the progression of the rights of autistic people 
and will have important implications for practice and 
the public understanding of autism (Cage, Di Monaco, 
& Newell, 2019).
We propose two priority areas for developing this field 
of research: building an understanding of the mecha-
nisms behind social development in autism and creating 
standardized assessments that are sensitive to change 
and the growth of social skills in autistic people.
Understanding Developmental 
Mechanisms
The DMH predicts that gaps in communication styles 
among nonautistic people and autistic people increase 
over time, resulting in higher levels of misunderstand-
ing within interactions over development. But what 
contributes to this widening gap in understanding? To 
answer this question, research (where possible) must first 
consider the developmental trajectories of social mecha-
nisms, capturing developmental processes rather than 
static states, for example, comparing autistic participants 
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to typically developing (TD) groups at a single point in 
time. Most research on autism and social cognition has 
traditionally adopted cross-sectional methods; however, 
findings from longitudinal studies across developmental-
disorder research consistently highlight the difficulties 
of overlaying findings from adults, or one time point, 
onto developmental processes (e.g., Bishop, 1997; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1997, 1998). Although adopting adult 
frameworks can be valuable when considering end-
state development, understanding dynamic changes in 
behavioral and cognitive profiles across development 
will be imperative for understanding the age at which 
these misattunements begin to emerge, how they change 
over time, and the causal mechanisms underlying com-
munication styles in autism. Furthermore, identifying 
autism-specific social-communicative developmental 
trajectories rather than viewing development in autism 
in terms of divergences from typical development can 
help us to better understand the factors that contribute 
to social development and later-life outcomes for autistic 
people.
In addition to changes in methodological approaches, 
it is important to acknowledge factors that may specifi-
cally underpin neurodiverse social-cognitive develop-
ment. A complex interplay of cognitive and environmental 
factors underpin the development of social cognition 
in TD children (Kilford, Garrett, & Blakemore, 2016). 
However, there may be differences in which factors 
play critical roles in social development between chil-
dren with autism and TD children. For example, cogni-
tive factors that are known to contribute to nonautistic 
social development include language skills (Fitch, 
Huber, & Bugnyar, 2010), executive functions (Blakemore 
& Choudhury, 2006), and IQ (Pellegrini, 1985). Autism-
specific environmental factors that could contribute to 
social development include parental knowledge and 
understanding of autism (e.g., Green et al., 2010), expe-
rience in mainstream or specialist education settings, 
and experience of peer-support systems for autistic 
people. It is important to have the scientific infrastruc-
ture to chart these developments and to build an under-
standing of autism-specific social-development 
trajectories and the mechanisms that underlie them.
Implementing developmental research that includes 
autism-specific factors could have a real-world impact. 
For example, researchers are beginning to understand 
some of the difficulties that many autistic people face 
regarding social inclusion and the impact of camouflag-
ing (e.g., using explicit techniques to hide behaviors 
associated with autism and hiding social difficulties) on 
mental health outcomes (Hull et al., 2017). One impor-
tant question from a developmental perspective is the 
extent to which being in an autism-specific environ-
ment (i.e., an environment in which autistic people 
interact with other autistic people) promotes more 
enriching school or life experiences, reduces camouflag-
ing, and reduces isolation. Research such as this could 
have a positive impact on areas such as education, 
health, and social-care settings, which have been identi-
fied as priority research areas by autistic people (Cusack 
& Sterry, 2016).
Standardized Assessments
To facilitate this type of developmental research, it is 
crucial to design measures of social cognition that are 
sensitive specifically to the social and communication 
skills of autistic people. The social-cognition assess-
ments used in research are currently based on nonau-
tistic social interactions and norms (Morrison et  al., 
2019). Although emerging research shows that autistic 
people can interact as efficiently as nonautistic people 
(although their interaction styles may not conform to 
nonautistic norms), this directly contradicts findings 
from social-cognitive-deficit accounts. It is therefore 
unsurprising that autistic people often perform signifi-
cantly more poorly than nonautistic people on fre-
quently used social-cognition measures. Furthermore, 
it is increasingly evident that performance of autistic 
people on measures of nonautistic social cognition are 
unlikely to accurately predict a person’s real-world 
functional and social skills (Sasson, Morrison, Kelsven, 
& Pinkham, 2020). One key example comes from 
research focusing on theory of mind (ToM) abilities. 
ToM tasks are still widely used to measure the ability 
to attribute mental states to others and the association 
with other aspects of social-communicative functioning 
(Gernsbacher & Yergeau, 2019). However, some authors 
argue that ToM-based tasks do not fully represent the 
abilities of nonautistic people or autistic people because 
all tasks are centered around mental states derived from 
nonautistic people (see Livingston, Carr, & Shah, 2019; 
Gernsbacher & Yergeau, 2019). We suggest that future 
assessments should aim to elucidate whether autistic 
ToM abilities are more successful among other autistic 
people and whether social difficulties for people are 
due, in part, to nonautistic difficulties in understanding 
autism-specific mental states.
It should therefore be a priority for researchers to 
create a set of autism-specific and autism-inclusive 
assessments that are coproduced with members of the 
autistic community from a wide range of backgrounds. 
This set of assessments would ensure that they assess 
an accurate conceptualization of successful social inter-
actions from autistic people. These measures could be 
used to explore the developmental trajectory of the 
social skills of autistic people and the impact of envi-
ronment and cognitive skills as described above.
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Toward a New Theoretical Understanding 
of Autism and Social Interaction
Understanding the underlying differences in communi-
cation for autistic people is an essential step in bridging 
the interaction gaps and understanding between differ-
ent neurotypes. Conceptualizing communication differ-
ences across neurotypes as bidirectional while at the 
same time acknowledging that autistic people face vary-
ing communication difficulties provides a valuable 
opportunity for future research to influence ways of 
thinking about differences at a societal level. For exam-
ple, the limited research that exists on the interactions 
between different neurotypes suggests that additional 
social difficulties can be exacerbated by negative per-
ceptions and judgments made by nonautistic individu-
als (Cage et  al., 2019; Sasson et  al., 2017). It is also 
possible that increased familiarity and understanding 
reduces prejudice and enforces positive effects in terms 
of interactions. Alleviating the pressure placed on autis-
tic people to move toward “typical cognitive function-
ing” can reduce stigma, promote inclusivity, and embrace 
the individual (Bolis, Balsters, Wenderoth, Becchio, & 
Schilbach, 2017).
Our understanding of autism is changing, with 
increasing evidence suggesting that social difficulties 
are at least in part bidirectional. By understanding the 
mechanisms behind positive autism-specific interac-
tions, we can make a real-world difference on both the 
support and practice autistic people receive and the 
public understanding of autism. Bringing neurodiversity 
to the forefront of research by implementing richer, 
inclusive methodologies and participatory approaches 
could provide a bold reconceptualization of social abili-
ties in neurodivergent individuals. Challenging the sta-
tus quo of social cognition could lead to a paradigm 
shift in our understanding not only of autism but also 
a range of neurodivergences and highlight the need to 
consider how we describe and measure other psycho-
logically defined conditions. Recognizing and embrac-
ing the neurodiversity model within scientific research 
and adopting research frameworks that focus on differ-
ence, not deficit, allows the research community to 
explore meaningful questions that will improve the 
lives of neurodivergent people (Kapp, Gillespie-Lynch, 
Sherman, & Hutman, 2013). Crucially, this includes 
translational work that provides opportunities for effec-
tively supporting autistic people in education, health, 
and social care.
Charting social development over time, conceptual-
ized within a framework of strengths, could revolution-
ize the way we understand social interaction in autism 
and other neurodevelopmental conditions. This research 
framework creates opportunities for exploring new and 
exciting hypotheses and novel methodologies and sup-
ports and promotes a framework that members of the 
autism community have advocated for many years.
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Note
1. There is debate regarding the language used when describ-
ing autism. In this article we use identity-first language (e.g., 
“autistic person”) as opposed to person-first language (e.g., 
“person with autism”) to respect the preference of the majority 
of autistic people (see Gernsbacher, 2017; Kenny et al., 2016).
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